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IN THE SUPREIVlE COURT
OF THE STAI'E OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
vs.

\

\

Plaintiff, )
1

1

Case No.

THE HONORABLE HENRY
, 10730
HUGGER!, DISTRICT JUDGE, )
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

AN EXTRAORDINARY 'VRIT IS AN
AYAILABLE REMEDY TO ISSUE
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
The plaintiff submits that the defendant's contenlion that an extraordinary writ is not aYailable in the
instant ease, is not well taken. The posture of this
Lase dearl~, supports the issuance of an extraordinary
writ.
1

The plaintiff seeks prosecution of C. ,V. "Buck'.
Brady on the charge of first degree perjury.(t) The
perjury was allegedly committed during his testimony
before a grand jury convened in Salt Lake County i~
1965. Subsequent to an indictment being returned
against Mr. Brady, he filed a motion to suppress the
testimony given before the grand jury because of a
claimed violation of his constitutional rights. After
considering the issues, the defendant granted Brady's
motion to suppress the evidence of the perjury. The
order to suppress effectively precluded any further
prosecution because the very evidence of the perjury
could not be used. The legal import of the court's order
was to dismiss the case. The District Attorney of the
Third J udical District then proceeded two ways. The
first was to appeal from the defendant's order and the
second to apply to this court for an extraordinary writ
to review the defendant's decision. It seems well settled
that an appeal may not be taken from an order that is
not final. Section 77-39-4 Utah Code Annotated, 1953;
People v. Hill, 3 Utah 334, 3 Pac. 75 ( 1884). Decisions
from the United States Supreme Court have ruled that
orders on motions to suppress were not appealable by
the government since they were not final. Caproll v.
Umted States, 354 U.S. 394 ( 1957) ; Di Bella v. United
States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962). In Cipes, Moore's Federal
Practice, Vol. 8, p. 41-30 comments as to this situation:

1

"While a defendant whose motion to suppress
is denied may raise the point on appeal in the ;

--( 1) This charge

is different than the prosecution on a similai
charge now on appeal before the court.

2

court of conYiction, if the motio11 is granted the
goyernment may be cffectiYely foreclosed from
prose<:uting if all or substantially all of its evidence is suppressed."
See also, Cipes, suprn P 12.05 [2] p. 12-27.
There is nothing to suggest that in this case the
position of the State of U tall is any different.
Cipes, suz;ra notes that under these circumstances
the right to mandamus may be appropriate. Cipes,
Moore's Pederal Practices, Yol. 8, ~ 12.05 (2] p. 12-29.
In United States v. Igoe, 331 F. 2d 766 (7th Cir. 1964)
the Seventh Circuit granted a writ of mandamus against
a trial judge who wrongfully dismissed the gm"ernment
ease under circumstances where the decision was not
appealable.U) The Government's prosecution was effel'tiwly thwarted and the court determined under such
circumstances a writ of mandamus would be available.
The court observed:
"'Vith respect to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus, on the other hand, we have considered
all arguments a<lYanced in opposition to it and
find them unconvincing. 'Ve believe that the writ
must be granted here. The District Court is directed to reinstate this case and set it for trial."
.T udge Schnackenberg, in his concuring opinion,
noted:
121 ~Pe Cipc'S. Moore's F:'deral P1·aci.ic:~. Vol. 8. CJ 1205 : 21.
131 [n. 1''1ote 73 Har. L. Re\· 1036. 1399 (1960) i. is wisely ob:wrved: ·"Fu rthermo:-c \: se'.: m~· the ? ppell2 l 2 ju ,·i.c.rlictior
'hould expand as th0 powc1· 0£ 1hc distric' >:our:.· •O dismis~
1~ enlarged, in order to m'-lin!3in adeqm1"e sup2, ..v·is;on cvc1
Ilic lower court."

3

"In answer to a contention of defendant that
neither by appeal or mandamus can the government secure a review by this court of the dismissal of the instant case for want of prosecu·
tion. I wish to add that this question is to be
determined not by its form but by its substance.''
Applying the above reasoning to the circumstances i
of this case it is clear that the substance of the defend- .
ant's order would effectively terminate the prosecution
of Mr. Brady. Under these circumstances it was tanta·
mount to a dismissal of the charges. The public as well
as the defendant, has a right to substantial justice, and
the prosecution of a case should not be arrested because
the trial court has acted erroneously. Under such cir·
cumstances review by extraordinary writ is allowable.
1

In this case the defendant did not purport to enter
his order as a matter of discretion, but concluded that
sound constitutional principles dictated such a result.
The case and authorities relating to the unavailability
of mandamus or like writs to review discretionary acts
are, therefore, inapplicable since this case does not pre·
sent a situation where the evidence was of a nature that
the trial court could admit or exclude in its discretion
and the Court did not purport to so rule. In 35 Am. J ur.
Mandamus§ 294, it is observed:
"Mandamus will issue, also, to compel the co~rt
to reinstate a criminal case, discontinued or dismissed for reasons insufficient in law."
The above rules have substantial support in case
law from this court.
4

1

In the early case of People v. Van 1~assel, 13 Utah
9, 43 Pac. 625 ( 1896) a justices court dismissed a petition and after application for mandamus to the district
court, the Territorial Supreme Court held mandamus
was applicable to compel the court to accept jurisdiction
and try the cause. In State e.v rel Neilson vs. Third
Judicial District Court, 36 Utah 223, 102 Pac. 868
(1909) this court ruled mandamus was applicable to
review the arbitrary dismissal of case.
In Hanson v. Iverson, 61 Utah 172, 211 Pac. 682
(1922) this court held mandamus applicable to review
a dismissal where the trial court ruled it had no jurisdiction as a matter of law. In State v. Second District
Court, 36 Utah 396, 104 Pac. 282 (1909) a writ of
mandamus was denied the District Attorney from the
dismissal of an action, but only after the court reviewed
the substance of the application and found it insufficient
on the merits and that, therefore, mandamus was inapplicable. Therefore, treating the substance of this
case, rather than form, it is clear mandamus is an appropriate remedy.
In addition certiorari would be an appropriate
remedy if the defendant exercised his discretion and
abused the exercise as plaintiff submits occurred. Rule
65 B(b) (2) U.R.C.P. provides certiorari is available
"lw ]here an inferior tribunal ... or officer exercising
judicial functons has ... abused its discretion;." See
rtlso lli,qgins v. Burton, 64 Utah 550, 232 Pac. 915
(1924).

5

Obviously, the extraordinary writ is available in
this case to compel the defendant to accept jurisdicti011
and proceed to trial.

ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY
The plaintiff wishes to call to the Court's attentiou
two relevant authorities not noted in the plaintiff's
initial brief.
In Sobel, The New Confession Standards, Miranda
v. Arizona ( 1966) the Honorable Nathan R. Sobel,
Justice of the Supreme Court, Kings County, New
York, discusses the application of Miranda in the context of a grand jury. He notes the New York rule on
appearance before grand juries and states:
"The federal courts do not follow this minority
view. In the federal courts, a subpoena is not
'compulsion.' Therefore, a de facto 'witness' or
'target' or a de jure defendant may be subpoenaed before the grand jury and unless a
claim of privilege is made, any testimony obtained may be used at the trial."
This clearly acknowledges that as yet the federal
rule nor the Federal Constitution require the result
reached by the defendant.
In an article, September 26, 1966, the Grand Jmy:
Protection Against the State or Prosecutor's Rubber
Stamp, New York Times, p. 44, the nature of the Ne\\'
York Grand J nry system is discussed and it is note<l

6

the New York Constitution requires a grand jury indictment for a felony. Thus, a "target" situation can
exist if the indictment put before the Grand Jury
naming the defendant results in his also being called
as a witness. This is not the case in Utah. The New
York cases are therefore of limited value.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted this court should issue
au extraordinary writ requiring the defendant to admit
the excluded evidence and to proceed to trial in the case
of State v. Brady.

Respectfully submitted,
JAY ELMER BANKS
District Attorney
Third Judicial District
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